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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
AND THE LAW OF INSURANCE 1975
By R. A. HASSON*
The year 1975 was very important one for the law of insurance in the Supreme Court of Canada, and the major decisions handed down by the court
deserve to be examined in some detail. The major cases can be divided conveniently into three groups: the "illegal act" cases, the subrogation cases and the
failure to co-operate case which might well be called "the case the court did
not hear." It is proposed to examine these cases in turn and to suggest
alternative methods of analysis from those employed in the court's decisions.
A. THE "ILLEGAL ACT" CASES
The background to the saga of Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Walkem
Machinery Ltd.,' is quite well known. Washington Iron Works designed and
manufactured a special type of crane which the Straits Towing Company used
on its barge, the "Straits Logger," a self-unloading barge designed for transporting logs. Walkem was the agent and distributor of the crane in British
Columbia. On September 16, 1966, one of the two cranes supplied by Washington and erected on the "Straits Logger" collapsed. The Straits Towing
Company were successful in a claim against Walkem and Washington who
were held to have been negligent in returning the vessel to the Straits Towing
Company in an inadequate state of repair.2
After having been made to pay 25% of the damages to the Straits
Company, 3 Walkem then sought to be indemnified by the Canadian Indemnity
Company under a comprehensive Business Liability Policy. It was admitted by
both parties that if Walkem's negligence amounted to an "accident," it was
entitled to be indemnified.
The trial judge had described the plaintiff (Walkem's) negligence in the
following language: "Walkem knew of the dangerous condition of the crane,
but nevertheless pawned off on an unsuspecting customer an inadequately and
negligently repaired piece of equipment."4 This finding of fact was accepted
© Copyright, 1976, R. A. Hasson.
* R. A. Hasson is a Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The author is very grateful to his colleagues Harry J. Glasbeek and John D. McCamus
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. They are not, of course,
responsible for any of the views expressed.
1 [1976] S.C.R. 309; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
2 See, Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works and Walkem Machinery and
Equipment Ltd., [1974] S.C.R. 1189; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530.
3
Damages were paid for the loss of production and they were calculated in accordance with the formula laid down in the Rivtow case (see, id.).
4Straits Towing Ltd. v. Washington, [1970] Ins. L. R. 982, 983.
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by the Supreme Court which, nonetheless, held that Walkem was entitled to
be indemnified because what had occurred was an "accident." This seems to
be a startling application of the term "accident."
Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of accident, all
the known legal definitions of the term emphasize that the occurrence must
be unexpected. It is extremely difficult to envisage how a distributor who
sends out machinery which is, to his knowledge, dangerously defective can be
said to have caused an unexpected loss. There may be good reasons for giving
"accident" a wider meaning than usual, but the court did not advance any
reasons.6 Instead, Mr. Justice Pigeon, speaking for the majority, stated:
... I wish to add that in construing the word "accident" in this policy, one should
bear in mind that negligence is by far the most frequent source of exceptional
liability which a businessman has to contend with. Therefore, a policy which would
not cover liability due to negligence could not properly be called "comprehensive."
But foreseeability is an essential element of such liability. If calculated risks and
dangerous operations are excluded, what is left but some exceptional causes (sic)
of liability?7

The court is, at this point, attacking a straw man. No one could argue
that businessmen should not be able to insure against liability which results
from their negligence. To do so would make liability insurance largely pointless. But it is extremely difficult to comprehend why a businessman who
knowingly sells or provides dangerous and defective machinery or goods

should be able to claim from an insurance fund on an equal footing with
those businessmen who carry on their businesses in good faith. The moral
difference between inevitable acts of negligence which occur in the running
of any business, however well-managed, and the kind of calculated risk which
Walkem took, seems to be fairly clear, and it is wrong for the law to ignore
that difference. Furthermore, to deny indemnity to the miniscule number of
entrepreneurs who suffer losses after having taken calculated risks would have a
minimal effect on the operation of liability insurance.
The distinction between negligent and reckless acts which the Supreme
Court, in effect, obliterated in the Walkem case is one which had previously
SSee, e.g., the statement of Lord Lindley in Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] A.C. 443 at
453: "The word 'accident' is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning.
Speaking generally, but with reference to legal liabilities, an accident means any unintended and unexpected occurrence which produces hurt or loss." There are countless
similar statements in the cases and treatises, but there is no point in reproducing them.
0 One good reason for giving "accident" a broader meaning than usual is the fact
that personal injury rather than economic loss has been suffered. It was on this basis that
the English courts held, for example, that murder was an "accident" within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act; see, e.g., Trim Joint District School Board of
Management v. Kelly, [1914] A.C. 667. It would also be legitimate to hold that harm
caused as a result of a deliberate act was an "accident" if the insured person who deliberately caused the harm was insane.
T [1976] S.C.R. 309, 317; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 7. Mr. Justice Ritchie concurred in the
result reached by the court but expressed the view that "I do not, however, agree that
the word 'accident' as used in a comprehensive business liability policy includes a 'calculated risk' which phrase appears to me to imply the very antithesis of an 'unlooked
for mishap or occurrence'." [1976] S.C.R. 309, 318; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 2. Since Walkem
did take "a calculated risk," it is difficult to see why his Lordship did not dissent.
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been recognised both by the Ontario Court of Appeal and by the Manitoba

Court of Appeal. In the Ontario case, Crisp v. Delta Tile and Terrazzo Co.,8
the defendant was carrying out grinding operations in the plaintiff's basement.
Because the defendant took no preventative steps, the dust was allowed to
escape and spread throughout the plaintiffs house. The Ontario Court of
Appeal refused to hold that the loss the defendant had caused was an "accident." Aylesworth, J.A., giving the opinion of the court, said:
There was ...a deliberate courting of the risk with knowledge of the risk, there
was an element of reckless conduct in the sense that they could not have cared
whether or not the dust damage would ensue when they proceeded with the work
in the way they did with the knowledge they had.9

The Supreme Court in Walkem did not mention the Crisp case, but it did
discuss the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Marshall Wells of

Canada Ltd. v. Winnipeg Supply and Fuel,10 in which the Manitoba Court
of Appeal approved the principle stated in the Crisp case. The manner in
which the Supreme Court read the MarshallWells case approaches the bizarre.
Mr. Justice Pigeon quoted the following language from the dissenting opinion
of Freedman, J.A.:
With respect, I am of the view that what occurred here was an accident. One
must avoid the danger of construing that term as if it were equivalent to "inevitable
accident." That a mishap might have been avoided by the exercise of greater care
and diligence does not automatically take it out of the range of accident. Expressed
another way, "negligence" and "accident" as here used are not mutually exclusive
terms. They may co-exist.'1

This passage does not do justice to the views of Freedman, J.A. Freedman,
J.A., accepted the principle stated in the Crisp case and dissented in the
Marshall Wells case because "[n]o... deliberate or reckless conduct can be
alleged against the defendant, Litz, in the present case. Nor did the learned

trial judge make any such finding."'1 2 The disagreement between Freedman,
J.A., and his colleagues shows that it may be difficult, on a given set of facts,

to make a distinction between negligent and reckless behaviour, but all the
judges were agreed that an attempt should be made to draw such a line. What
is troubling about the Walkem decision is that it obliterates that line, without
a single reason being given for so doing.' 8
The Supreme Court in Walkem also derived support for its definition
8 [19611 O.W.N. 278; [1961] Ins.L.R. 1-046, reversing [1961] O.W.N. 29; [1961]
Ins. L. R. 1-029.
9 [1961] O.W.N. 278, 279.
10 (1964), 49 W.W.R. 664.
11 Quoted at [19761 S.C.R. 309, 314-315; 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 5.
12 (1964), 49 W.W.R. 664, 665.
IsThere can be no doubt that the line has been obliterated. Thus, Mr. Justice Pigeon
stated in his opinion that "[ifn my view, the test ... whether or not something was done
by or for the insured 'with intent to bring about loss or damage' is the very same test which
must be applied to decide whether the occurrence is an accident or whether it is a crime
barring recovery." [1976] S.C.R. 309, 318; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 7.
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of "accident" from two English Workmen's Compensation cases.' 4 It is difficult, however, to see the relevance of these cases to the question before the
court. In the first place, in Workmen's Compensation cases, one is concerned
with claims for physical injury, an interest that has traditionally received
greater protection from the law than claims for economic loss. 15 Second, there
is no evidence in either of the two cases cited by the court that the particular
workman was negligent, much less reckless.
The Supreme Court, in the course of deciding Walkem, also delivered
some dicta on the subject of criminal negligence which are as disturbing as
the decision itself. The point arose in the following way. Canadian Indemnity
argued that, in addition to being reckless, Walkem was not entitled to be
indemnified since it (Walkem) was guilty of criminal negligence. The court
held, correctly, that the point did not arise since Walkem had not been found
guilty of criminal negligence, but it held that even if Walkem had been found
guilty of criminal negligence, it would have been entitled to be indemnified.
The court reached this amazing conclusion on the basis of the following statutory provision in the British Columbia InsuranceAct:
Unless the contract otherwise provides, a violation of any criminal or other law in
force in the Province or elsewhere does not, ipso facto, render unenforceable a
claim for indemnity under a contract of insurance except where the violation is
committed by the insured, or by another person with the consent of the insured,
with intent to bring about loss or damage ....
36

According to Mr. Justice Pigeon, speaking for the majority, the effect of this
provision is that Walkem could be deprived of indemnity only it it could be
shown that Walkem sent the crane intending that the crane should collapse and
cause damage. According to the court, there was no further problem once
counsel for Canadian Indemnity had answered "No" to the following question
from the Bench: "Are you saying that the Company intended this to happen?' 7
It is suggested that the statutory provision the court was purporting to
construe does not compel this remarkable result. The statute states that, unless
the crime has been committed with intent to bring about loss or damage, the
fact that a criminal act has been committed does not automatically (or "ipso
facto") deprive the insured of an indemnity. Stated another way, the fact that
a non-intentional criminal act has been committed does not automatically
entitle the insured to an indemnity. In other words, what the court is required
to do in a case where an insured has committed a non-intentional criminal act
and is seeking an indemnity, is to balance the competing social interests for
and against recovery. Some of the factors which would appear to be relevant
in this weighing process are the character of the injury inflicted (e.g., was the
14 Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. Ltd., [1903] A.C. 443 (workman ruptured himself
by an act of over-exertion) and Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [19101 A.C. 242 (a
workman who was suffering from serious aneurism suddenly fell down dead from rupture
of the aneurism while at work).
15
See, for example, the decision in Rivtow Marine itself (supra, note 2).
16 See, s. 100 of the Insurance Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 197. This provision exists in
all the other common law provinces. The historical background to the section is outlined
in a note by G. W. Reed in (1953), 31 C.B.R. 319.
'7 [1976] S.C.R. 309, 317; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 7.
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harm suffered physical injury or economic loss) and the character of the
criminal offence (e.g., how serious was the criminal violation committed by
the insured).s1 No one would deny that this balancing process is an extremely
difficult one, and it may well be that reasonable men balancing the same factors might come to different results. However, at least in this context, the
failure to take into account competing social interests will lead to very unfortunate results.
It is difficult to regard Walkem's claim to indemnity as being a particularly meritorious one. The act of sending out a crane which was known to be
in a dangerous state must, by any standards, be regarded as a grossly immoral
act. To argue that the criminal law and an increase in premiums constitute
effective sanctions against this kind of behaviour may be unrealistic.
To deal with the criminal sanction first, even if there is a conviction for
criminal negligence, it seems likely that the penalty imposed will be light, as
will frequently be the case where only damage to property is caused.
Second, as regards the increase of premiums, there is serious reason to
doubt that an enterprise such as Walkem would have had its premiums
greatly increased. Large commercial concerns today frequently buy a large
insurance package which may include, inter alia, liability insurance,
fire insurance for the company's buildings, automobile insurance for the
company's automobiles and group accident insurance for the company's employees. This practice of buying insurance in bulk means that the insurer is
guaranteed a very sizeable premium. Consequently, the insurer will think
twice before imposing massive increases in, for example, liability insurance,
even for an enterprise with a bad accident record. 19 In doing so, the insurer
runs the risk of losing a substantial amount of premium income. 20
The only plausible argument that can be put forward for granting Walkem
indemnity is that a failure to do so might defeat the Straits Towing Company's
claim for loss of production against Walkem. It should be noted, however, that,
in the first place, the Straits Towing Company would have been able to purchase
business interruption insurance to cover this loss. Secondly, it is often possible
to make up losses of production by such expedients as working overtime.2 1
18

See, McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance (1941), 41 Columbia

L.Rev. 26; Farbstein and Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts
(1969), 20 Hastings LJ. 1219.
19
See, Atiyah, Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work Connected Accidents - 11 (1975), 4 Industrial L.J 89, 91-92.
20
Another problem is that because "severity has always been measured in cost
terms," an enterprise which has been guilty of reckless behaviour may still have its premiums affected only marginally, if the layout by the insurer is small; see, Atiyah (id. at
96).
21
See, the statement of Lord Denning M.R. in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v.
Martin, [1973] Q.B. 27. In dismissing a claim for loss of production following damage

to a cable, his Lordship said: "... . most people are content to take the risk on themselves.
When the supply is cut off, they do not go running round to their solicitor. They do not
try to find out whether it was anyone's fault. They just put up with it. They try to make

up the economic loss by doing more work the next day." (at 38).
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On a consideration of all of the above factors, it is suggested that
Walkem should not have been able to claim an indemnity from its insurer.
Less than two months after its decision in the Walkem case,22 the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Co-operative Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Saindon.23 The contrast between the two decisions is onthing less than starling.
The incident which gave rise to the Saindon case started with a dispute
over the cutting of branches on the defendant's cherry tree. Angered by the
removal of the cherry tree branches, the defendant threatened the plaintiff
by raising a rotary lawn mower shoulder-high and directing it towards the
plaintiff's face. The plaintiff tried to protect himself and, in doing so, the blades
of the lawn mower struck both of the plaintiff's hands, severing the fingers
from his left hand and injuring his right wrist.
Mr. Justice Pichette allowed the plaintiffs tort claim against the defen-

dant and awarded him $39,942.40 by way of special and general damages.
The learned
judge, however, dismissed the third party claim against the liability
24
insurer.
Mr. Justice Pichette denied the claim against the liability insurer on two
grounds. First, the learned judge stated that the incident fell outside the coverage of the defendant's liability insurance policy which did not apply to "bodily
injury or personal damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of an
insured." Second, Mr. Justice Pichette felt bound to deny the claim against the
liability insurer because of the following provision in the New Brunswick
InsuranceAct:
Unless the contract otherwise provides, a violation of any criminal or other law
in force in the Province or elsewhere does not, ipso facto, render unenforceable
a claim for indemnity under a contract of insurance except where the violation is
committed by the insured, or by another person
with the consent of the insured,
with intent to bring about loss or damage.... 2 5

The New Brunswick Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge in a crisp
and lucid opinion. Mr. Justice Limerick, giving the opinion of the court,
stated simply:
As the injury to the plaintiff was not intentionally inflicted, but was the unforeseen
result of a criminal act, the effect of section 2 above is to negate the "Public Policy
Rule" and as the insurer in the contract excludes only personal injuries intentionally inflicted and does not exclude injuries otherwise arising out of the commission
of a criminal act, the insurer is not relieved of its liability on the ground of public
policy. 20

22 [1975] Ins.L.R. 2290; 56 D.L.R. (3d) 556. There is a valuable discussion of this
case by Professor Baer in Insurance Law (1976), 8 Ottawa L.R. 218, 224-228 to which
I am much indebted.
28The Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Walkem case on January 28,
1975. The decision in the Saindon case was announced on March 26, 1975.
24
Sirois v. Saindon, 7 N.B. (2d) 280, 285; [1974] Ins. L.R. 2000, 2002; 44 D.L.R.
(3d) 469, 472.
25
Section 2 of the New Brunswick Insurance Act, (N.B. Rev. Stat. c. 1-12 (1973)).
2
6 Supra, note 24.
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This statement of principle is so unexceptionable and is so fully supported by authority, 27 that one is surprised that the Supreme Court even gave
leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court not only gave leave to appeal but, in fact, reversedS
the decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal by a majority of 6-3.2
Incredibly, the majority failed to cite its own decision in the Walkem case.
According to the principle stated in that case, there is said to be an "accident"
for insurance purposes unless the insured committed the act deliberately.
Since the defendant did not deliberately intend to injure the plaintiff with the
lawn-mower, the court should, to have been consistent with its decision in
Walkem, have held that there was an "accident" within the meaning of the
defendant's Comprehensive Personal Liability policy.
Indeed, Saindon is a much stronger case than Walkem for deciding that
what had occurred was an "accident." The most that can be said of the defendant's behaviour in Saindon is that he should have foreseen that serious
harm from his thoughtless act might result. The defendant in Walkem not
only should have foreseen, but it did in fact foresee the risk of serious harm
when it sent out a dangerously defective crane. If the law of insurance is going
to be used in an attempt to influence human behaviour, and there is no doubt
that the courts already use the law with this end in mind, it would seem to
make far more sense to deny indemnity to someone who runs a calculated
risk for profit rather than to someone who acts recklessly in the heat of the
moment.
There is another factor that makes the claim for indemnity stronger in
Saindon than it is in Walkern. In Saindon, the claim related to physical injury
whereas in Walkem it related to economic loss. It has been argued above that
the law has been more solicitous towards physical injury than towards economic loss and this point is illustrated very well in the various provincial
Insurance Acts. Thus, in the automobile insurance liability provisions of the
provincial Insurance Acts, it is provided that in an action by an accident
victim against a motor vehicle insurer, the latter cannot set up as a defence
"any contravention of the Criminal Code (Canada) or a statute of any
province or territory of Canada or of any state or the District of Columbia
of the United States of America by the owner or driver of the automobile. ..

.""

The result in the Saindon case means that an accident victim is

treated differently depending on whether he is injured by an automobile or
by some other object, such as a lawn-mower. The highest court in the land
should not make such distinctions unless it is compelled to do so by an un27

See, e.g., Prince George White Truck Sales Ltd. v. Canadian Indemnity Co.,
[1974] Ins.L.R. 1923; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 616; Tiko Elec. Co. v. CanadianSurety Co., [1973]
Ins.L.R. 1888; Stevenson v. Continental Insurance Co., [1973] 6 W.W.R. 316, [1973]
Ins.L.R. 1818.
2
8 Mr. Justice Ritchie gave the opinion of the majority with which Justices Martland,
Judson, Spence, Dickson and de Grandpr6 concurred. Chief Justice Laskin filed a dissenting opinion with which Justices Pigeon and Beetz concurred.

29
See, section 225(4) (c) of the Ontario Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224. (An
identical provision is to be found in the other provincial Insurance Acts.)
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ambiguous statutory provision. There is nothing in any provincial Insurance
Act that compels the drawing of any such bizarre lines.30
The only case the majority discussed in any detail was the decision of
the English Court of Appeal in Gray v. Barr.31 Mr. Justice Ritchie, speaking
for the majority, thought that while Gray v. Barr was "....

in no way binding

on this Court, nevertheless [it] appears to me to be most apt and persuasive
in the circumstances.13 2 An examination of that case is, therefore, in order.
In the Barr case, the appellant, who was covered by an insurance policy
with the respondent indemnifying him for all sums which "he shall become
legally liable to pay as damages in respect of bodily injuries to any person
caused by accident," had entered a farm-house with a loaded shot-gun and
fired a shot into the ceiling with the intention of frightening the occupant. The
occupant then grappled with him, and, as a result, the insured fell downstairs,
breaking the stock of the gun as he fell and involuntarily firing the second barrel
which killed the occupant. The insured's claim against his insurer was rejected
by the Court of Appeal which held that the occupant's death had not occurred
as a result of an "accident."
One of the problems with the decision in the Barr case is that it is extremely difficult to reconcile with three earlier English cases, one of them a
decision of the Court of Appeal. In Tinline v. White Cross Insurance3s and
James v. British General Insurance,34 the insureds were entitled to be
indemnified against sums which they should become legally liable to pay to
third parties as compensation for "accidental personal injury." In both cases,
the insureds drove recklessly and killed accident victims. Both insureds were
prosecuted and convicted of manslaughter. In both cases, the court held that
the insured was entitled to be indemnified.
Further, in Hardy v. Motor Insurers'Bureau,3 5 the Court of Appeal held
that an accident victim was entitled to recover from a motor vehicle insurer,
despite the fact that the driver of the vehicle was convicted on the charge of
maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm on the plaintiff.30 In his concurring
opinion, Diplock, L.J., addressed the policy questions in a vigorous manner:
I can see no reason in public policy for drawing a distinction between one kind
of wrongful act, of which a third party is the innocent victim, and another kind of
S0 The only distinction the provincial Insurance Acts compel is between the intentional infliction of injuries by an automobile (where the insurer has no defence) to a
claim by an accident victim and the intentional infliction of an injury by some other
object, where the insurer has a defence under the "Illegal Act" provision of the various
provincial Insurance Acts.
31 [1971] 2 Q.B. 554. The majority also made a passing reference to a dictum by
Mr. Justice Judson in FordMotor Co. of CanadaLtd. v. PrudentialAssurance Co. [1959]
S.C.R. 539; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 273.
82 [1975] Ins. L. R. 2290, 2292; 56 D.L.R. (3d) 556.
3 [1921] 3 K.B. 327.
34 [1927] 2 K.B. 311.
a5 [1964] 2 Q.B. 745.
8
0Although the Court of Appeal in Hardy (see, id.) said that it would be wrong to
indemnify the insured, the court, in effect, indemnified the insured, by allowing an action
against the insurer.
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wrongful act; between wrongful acts which are crimes on the part of the perpetrator and wrongful acts which are not crimes, or between wrongful acts which are
crimes of carelessness and wrongful acts which are intentional crimes. It seems to
me to be slightly unrealistic to suggest that a person who is not deterred by the risk
of a possible sentence of life imprisonment from using a vehicle with intent to
commit grievous bodily harm would be deterred by the fear that his civil liability
to his victim would not be discharged by his insurers. I do not myself feel8 7that by
dismissing this appeal we shall add significantly to the statistics of crime.

Since the validity of the motor manslaughter cases 38 was accepted by a
majority of members of the Court of Appeal in Barr,39 English law now seems
to draw distinction, for purposes of insurance coverage, between accidents
caused by motor vehicles and accidents caused by other objects. It is extremely doubtful if insurers, let alone laymen, could provide a satisfactory rationale
for treating the two cases differently.
Because the Barr case represents a combination of bad law and bad
40
policy, it has been vigorously criticized by commentators in English journals.
It is extremely unfortunate that the Supreme Court in Saindon did not meet
the criticisms of the Barr decision but instead chose to follow the latter case
uncritically.
Since the majority in Saindon did not articulate the policy (or policies)
they were seeking to further, one is left to speculate as to what the policies
may be. It is suggested that there are two possible policies the majority may
have been trying to pursue and that neither policy is a desirable one.
The first policy the majority may have been endeavouring to further in
Saindon is the deterrence of violent behaviour. There is a strong suggestion
by two judges in the Barr case (which the majority embraced so warmly in
Saindon) that some judges think that liability insurance should be used to
penalise wrongdoers. In the Barr case, Salmon, L.J., said that "[c]rimes of violence, particularly when committed with loaded guns, are amongst the worst
curses of this age. '" 41 In the same case, Phillimore, L.J., said that "[i]n an age
of violence - an age when the use of firearms is all too frequent - it would
be very odd if a man who had in his hands a loaded shotgun

. . .

and had

killed another ...could recover on an insurance policy." 42 It is difficult to see
how an insured, who, in a case such as Saindon or Barr, is undeterred
by the threat of criminal punishment, and is oblivious to the risk of
serious personal injury, is likely to be deterred by an increase in his liability
37 [1964] 2 Q.B. 745, 769-770.
38 See, supra, notes 33 and 34.
39 The correctness of the motor-manslaughter cases was accepted by Lord Denning,

M.R., [1971] 2 Q.B. 554, 568 ("it is settled beyond question that the insured is entitled
to recover") and by Salmon, L.J., 554, 581 ('These road traffic cases may be sui generis").
Phillimore, LJ., left the question open.
40

-

See, in particular, the excellent article by Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse

Public Policy in the Law of Contract (1972), Cambridge LJ. 144 and see, the notes

by Professor Jolowicz, (1970) Cambridge L.J. 194 and by Professor Fleming, (1971) 34
Modern L.Rev. 176. Both the latter comments criticise the decision at first instance.
41 [1971] 2 Q.B. 554, 581.
42 [197112 Q.B. 554, 587.
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insurance rates. 43 Second, the individual insured in cases like Saindon and
Barr is more likely to have his policy cancelled, or his rates greatly increased,
than is the commercial concern such as Walkem. 44 The short of the matter is that
denying the insured indemnity in a case such as Saindon is most unlikely to
deter anyone, and the only result of such decisions is to deprive innocent accident victims of indemnity, and, to compound injuries, to leave such accident
victims with massive bills for legal expenses.
A second possible rationale for a Saindon-type outcome has been suggested by Professor Fleming. In his criticism of the Barr case, Professor
Fleming stated that the existence of the British Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme "may 45thus conceivably justify the outcome in Gray v. Barr, but
not its reasoning."
It is suggested that the existence of a Criminal Injuries Compensation
Scheme in New Brunswick should not be regarded as a sufficient justification
for denying the insured an indemnity in a case such as Saindon. In the first
place, there is nothing in any of the provincial Criminal Injuries Compensation statutes providing that someone who is the victim of criminal conduct
must seek a remedy under the relevant provincial Criminal Injury Compensation statute. 46 It is wrong to penalise someone for exercising a choice which
the law clearly gives him. Second, it is relevant to note that the maximum
amount that can be paid under the New Brunswick Criminal Injuries CompensationAct is $10,000,47 - an amount which might be inadequate to cover
a victim's economic losses for a period of even a year. 48
In terms of poor craftmanship and bad social policy, the Saindon case
may well be the most unfortunate insurance decision the Supreme Court has
handed down since 1934 when the court gave its opinion in the Lindal case49
a decision that has now, happily, been reversed by statute.5 0
43

Compare the statement of the New York Insurance Department in the field of
road accidents. "Individual, last moment, driver mistakes - undeterred by fear of death,
injury, imprisonment, fine or loss of licence - surely cannot be deterred by fear of civil
liability against which one is insured." See, the Department's Report, Automobile Insurance... for Whose Benefit? (1970) at 12.
441For the reasons why this is likely to be so see text supra, notes 19 and 20.
45
See, (1971) 34 Modern L. Rev. 176, 181 n. 27.
46 A provision of this kind would mean that many cases of negligence would have
to be referred to the relevant Criminal Injuries Compensation Board because in many of
them it would appear that an injury has been caused in violation of the Criminal Code.
47
See, section 17(3) of the New Brunswick Compensation for Victims of Crime
Act (N.B. Stat. 1973 C-14).
48
In this connection, it is instructive to note that the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that benefits of $12,000 a year be paid to road accident victims;
see, Report on Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney-General,
1973).
4
) Home Insurance Co. of New York et al v. Lindal & Beattie, [1934] S.C.R. 33;
[1934] 1 D.L.R. 497. In this case, the Supreme Court refused to indemnify an insured
under an automobile liability policy because the insured had committed a criminal
offence.
50 See, e.g., section 225(4) (c) of the Ontario Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
There are identical provisions in other common law provincial Insurance Acts.
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THE SUBROGATION CASES

In 1937, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the case of United Motor
Services v. Hutson.51 In that case, the landlords agreed to insure a building
which they leased out to a tenant who used it as an automobile service garage.
The tenant agreed to repair the building except for damage caused, inter alia,
by fire. A fire occurred as a result of negligence on the part of the tenant's
employees and the landlords recovered from the insurers in respect of the
damage caused by the fire. The insurers (suing in the name of the landlords)
then sought to be subrogated to the landlords' rights against the tenant. The
Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, held
that the insurers were entitled to claim subrogation rights against the tenant.
The court might have decided that the right of subrogation was excluded for
two reasons. First, because the landlords, in insuring against fire, were also insuring in respect of fires caused negligently by the tenant. Second, according to
the exculpatory clause, when the tenant exculpated himself from fire, "fire" was
to be read as including fires caused by the defendant's negligence. The court, in
effect, rejected both these contentions. While the policy implications of the decision in Hutson are open to question, the decision itself is logically tenable.
Thirty-eight years after its decision in the Hutson case, the Supreme
Court decided Agnew-Surpass Shoe Stores Ltd. v. Cummer-Yonge Investments
Ltd.52 On very similar facts to those in the Hutson case,53 the Supreme Court,
by a majority of 7-2, decided that the insurer was not entitled to enforce the
landlord's subrogation rights against the tenant.
It is instructive to compare the relevant clauses in the two cases.
Hutson
Landlord'scovenant to insure
And the Lessor covenants to
pay all taxes in connection
with the demised premises and
all premiums of insurance upon the buildings erected thereon.

Exculpatory clause
And that the said Lessee will
repair, according to notice in
writing, reasonable wear and
tear and damage by fire, lightning and tempest, riot or public disorder or act on the part
of any governmental authority,
only excepted; provided never-

theless, that the Lessee shall
not be required to make repairs to the roof, nor exterior
or structural repairs.

Cummer-Yonge
The Lessor covenants to insure the shopping centre
including the said Building, excepting foundations
in each case against all risk of loss or damage
caused by or resulting from fire, lightning or tempest or any additional peril defined in a standard
fire insurance additional perils supplemental contract. All such insurance shall to the best of the
ability of the Lessor be to the full insurable value
of the property insured.
The Lessee shall take good and proper care of
the interior of the leased premises and appurtenances thereof (including all plate glass installed
in or upon the leased premises) and any improvements now or hereafter erected therein and make
all needed repairs and replacements thereto except
for reasonable wear and tear, repairs to the four
side walls, roof, skylights, foundation, floors and
the bearing structure of the Building forming part
thereof, damage to the building caused by water
damage and damage to the Building caused by
perils against which the Lessor is obligated to
insure hereunder.

51 [1975] Ins. L. R. 2309; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 676; see, Baer, (1976) 8 Ottawa L. Rev.
218, 242-243.
52 [1937] S.C.R. 294; [1937] 1 D.L.R. 737.
53 See, note 51, supra.
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The majority 4 held that the first ground of distinction between Hutson
and Cummer-Yonge was that it was only in the latter case that the landlord
had covenanted to insure. It is difficult to see why such importance should be
placed on the landlord's covenant to insure, particularly since it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether a landlord has, on the proper construction of the contract, obligated himself to insure.55 It is suggested that no
difference should be drawn between the case where the landlord takes out fire
insurance without there being any legal obligation on him to do so and one
where the landlord takes out fire insurance pursuant to a legally enforceable
agreement. The existence of a legally enforceable covenant to insure between
landlord and tenant does not show that either the insurer, the landlord or the
tenant expected the right of subrogation to be excluded. If the insurer and
the landlord intended the right of subrogation to be excluded, they could have
so provided, in express terms, in their insurance contract. 56 Similarly, the
existence of a covenant to insure on the part of the landlord, does not mean
that the tenant will not take out liability insurance to cover himself against
the consequences of his negligence.
The second difference the majority found between Hutson and CummerYonge was in the exculpatory clause used in the two cases. However, as Mr.
Justice de Grandpr6 pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Cummer-Yonge,
it is impossible to see a significant difference between the two exculpatory
clauses. In the Hutson case, the exculpatory clause covered the following
exceptions: "fire, lightning and tempest, riot or public disorder or act on the
part of any governmental authority."
Contrasting the relevant exculpatory clause in Cummer-Yonge, his Lordship made the following highly pertinent observations:
Here, if we read into the lease the perils mentioned in the insurance policy, we
have a list that is longer but not different in substance. Without being too technical,
it is fair to say that these perils are: fire, lightning, explosion, impact, riot, smoke,
sprinkler's leakage, windstorm and hail. It does not matter to my mind that the
exceptions, instead of being listed by name, are listed by reference to a document
which is standard in scope and well-known to the business world. On the authority
of Hutson, if the excepted risks had been listed specifically, the tenant would not
be successful in its contention that a negligent fire is part and parcel of the exclusion. In my view, the fact that
the exceptions are listed by reference does not make
57
any difference in the result.

It is suggested that a principled and rational basis for the result reached
54 On the subrogation issue there was a seven man majority made up of Chief
Justice Laskin, Justices Judson, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon, Dickson and Beetz. A differently
constituted majority of six justices held that the tenant was under an obligation to pay
rent during the period when the building could not be used because of fire. I do not
propose to deal with the latter issue in my comment.
55 Thus, it could be strongly argued that the landlord's undertaking to pay insurance
premiums in Hutson also imposed an obligation on him (the landlord) to procure adequate insurance for the building.
560 See, e.g., the decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in J. Clark & Son
v. Finnamore (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 236.
57 [1975] Ins. L. R. 2309, 2321; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 676, 698-99. (Mr. Justice Martland
expressed his agreement with Mr. Justice de Grandprd's dissent.)
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in Cummer-Yonge would have been to hold that when a landlord insures
against fire, this coverage extends to fires negligently caused by the tenant,
so as to give the latter the protection of the landlord's coverage. Alternatively
(and additionally), the court might have held that when there is an exception clause in the lease excepting "fire" losses, these include fires negligently
caused by the tenant. As the law stands at present, a court will, first, have
to determine whether the landlord covenanted to insure, which may be a
difficult question to resolve and is one that seems functionally irrelevant.
Second, the court will have to decide whether the perils which have been
excluded, have been excluded a la Hutson or i la Curnmer-Yonge. As Mr.
Justice de Grandpr, points out in his dissent, to interpret two very similarly
drafted exculpatory clauses in radically different ways is to elevate form over
substance.
If it be argued that a broad holding, as the one argued for here, would
substantially narrow the scope of subrogation, it is suggested that there are
powerful reasons for doing precisely this. In the first place, as Professor
Paterson has pointed out: "Even as to tortfeasors, it is arguable that since
the insurer is paid to take the risk of negligent losses, it should not shift the
loss to another."5 Second, if the interruption of the tenant's business and
the liability for the rent payable during the period when it is impossible to
carry on business are not sufficient deterrents5 9 against the tenant operating
negligently, 60 it is difficult to believe that subrogation liabilities will prove to
be much of a deterrent, particularly when the tenant may have insured against
these liabilities.
A little more than two months after its decision in Cummer-Yonge, the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ross Southward Tire Ltd. v.
Pyrotech Products61 , which again dealt with the problem of subrogation in the
context of a landlord-tenant relationship. The facts are simpler than those in
Cummer-Yonge. The landlord had insured its property but, under the terms
of the lease, the tenant was obliged to pay the insurance premiums. After
a fire had occurred because of the tenant's negligence, the insurer indemnified
the landlord and sought to enforce subrogation rights against the tenant. The
Supreme Court held, by a majority of 3-2,62 reversing the Ontario Court of
Appeal, that the payment of insurance rates by the tenant placed the risk
58 Essentials of Insurance Law (2nd ed., 1957), 152. The process of shifting losses
from one insurer to another in this manner is also very expensive; see Kimball and Davis,
The Extension of Insurance Subrogation (1962), 60 Mich. L. Rev. 841.
59 See, Brewer, An Inductive Approach to the Liabality of the Tenant for Negligence
(1951), 31 Boston U. L. Rev. 47 at 59:
"Tenants as a class are interested in protection from unpredictable, or more important, uninsurable responsibilities. Their desire for this protection cannot be
disposed of by a social need for the deterrent effect of civil judgments. If we can
draw any lesson at all from the field of automobile insurance, where the allocation
of responsibility by civil process has been attempted on a vast scale, this lesson
is that civil judgments are unsatisfactory both from the standpoint of preventing
future negligent conduct and compensating its victims."
60 There are, of course, similar sanctions operating in the case of residential tenants.
61 [1975] Ins. L. R. 2373; 57 D.L.R. (3d) 248.
62Chief Justice Laskin delivered the majority opinion with which Justices Judson
and Spence concurred; Justices Beetz and de Grandpr6 dissented.
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of loss on the landlord, and the landlord's insurer had no basis for asserting a
subrogated claim. It is difficult to see why such importance should be placed
on who pays the premiums. The tenant himself did not seem to think that
the operation of subrogation had been excluded, because he (the tenant)
had transferred a legal liability (fire) rider which had originally been taken
out when he had occupied different premises. As Chief Justice Laskin pointed
out in his opinion for the majority: "The existence of the policy means only
that litigation which in form is between a landlord and its tenant is in
substance a contest between two insurance companies." 6 3
The arbitrary results that flow from making the right to subrogation
depend on who pays the premium may be easily illustrated. Assume that the
landlord and the tenant both agree to pay half the premium (or otherwise
agree to share the cost). Does this mean that the insurer's right to subrogation is cut by half (or reduced by the appropriate amount)? Again, let us
imagine a case where the obligation to pay premiums is originally placed
on the landlord, who, after a while is unable or unwilling to pay the premiums,
and the tenant assumes the task of paying the premiums. Does the insurer's
right of subrogation cease to exist once the tenant starts paying insurance
premiums?
The truth of the matter is that the question of who pays premiums will
very often be decided on the basis of administrative convenience, and to make
the right of subrogation depend on factors of this kind, means that arbitrary
lines will be drawn between situations which insurers and laymen alike would
treat as identical.
In its celebrated decision in the Keefer case decided in 1901," the
Supreme Court held that a vendor could insure to protect his own interest as
well as that of the purchaser. What the court should have done in both
Cummer-Yonge and in Pyrotech Products is to have adopted a principle of
similar generality!65 By failing to do this, the court has left the lower courts
to make findings of fact which may be difficult to make. 66 The lower courts
will then have to make sharp distinctions on the basis of facts, the relevance
of which seems to be open to very serious doubt. Since the problem of subrogation occurs frequently in the landlord-tenant context, the failure of the
court to give clearer guidance to lower courts is a matter for concern.
C.

THE INSURED'S FAILURE TO CO-OPERATE

In Canadian Equipment Sales and Service Ltd. v. Continental Insurance Co., 7 the insurer agreed to pay all sums which the insured should
[1975] Ins. L. R. 2373, 2375; 57 D.L.R. (3d) 248, 253.
Phoenix Insurance (1902), 31 S.C.R. 144.
05 One unfortunate feature of the Keefer decision (see, id.) is that by purporting
to state the "intention of the parties," a lot of argument has been left to determine
exactly what the parties intended in each case. The proposed new rule that is being argued
for here should not be based on the presumed "intention' of the parties.
06For example, did the landlord covenant, in express terms, to take out adequate
insurance in line with the formula in Cummer-Yonge?
67 [1957] Ins. L. R. 2331; 59 D.L.R. (3d) 333.
63

04 Keefer v.
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become liable to pay "because of injury to or destruction of property . . .
including loss of use ...." A subcontractor of the insured, in the course of

work on a pipe belonging to a third party, allowed a piece of material to fall
into the pipe. Substantial expenses were then incurred in an unsuccessful
attempt to find the material, there being a reasonable fear that, if not found,
the material might block the pipe and cause extensive damage. The insured
was held liable for these expenses.
In a claim by the insured against the insurer to recover these expenses,
the Ontario Court of Appeal held, reversing the trial judge, that the insured
was entitled to be indemnified. The court held that, as soon as the material
fell into the pipe, the third party had a damaged pipe and the expenses incurred
by the insured were a natural consequence of that damage.
Thus far, the question is only one of construction of a particular insurance
policy. The important point for our purposes concerns the failure of the insured to give relevant information to the insurer as soon "as practicable"
as required by the policy. The accident had occurred on June 9 and the insured did not give the insurer notice until September 1. The trial judge held
that the insured had breached the policy condition requiring notice "as soon
as practicable." The trial judge also refused to give the insured relief under
section 103 of The InsuranceAct which provides:
Where there has been imperfect compliance with a statutory condition as to the
proof of loss to be given by the insured or other matter or thing required to be
done or omitted by the insured with respect to the loss and a consequent forfeiture
or avoidance of the insurance in whole or in part and the Court considers it inequitable that the insurance should be forfeited or avoided on that ground, the
Court may relieve against the forfeiture or avoidance on such terms as it considers
just.68

The trial judge felt that he could give relief only where the breach of the
duty to co-operate was of "a minor nature" and where there was "no possibility of prejudice" to the insurer.
The Court of Appeal refused to read section 103 so restrictively, and
it decided that the insured was entitled to an indemnity. The court held that
in cases of failure to co-operate, the insurer has to show "some actual proven
prejudice or potential prejudice which coulld not be quantified after the
event." 69 Further, the Court of Appeal seems to suggest that in addition to
having to show prejudice, the insurer must also show that the insured acted
in bad faith. 70
There was sufficient uncertainty in the Ontario Court of Appeal's formulation of the law for the Supreme Court to have granted leave to appeal, but
the court refused leave to appeal on October 8, 1975.
There are two major uncertainties in the Court of Appeal's statement
of the law. In the first place, are the two requirements of prejudice to the
insurer and the insured's bad faith independent of one another? In other
68

R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
69 [1975] Ins. L. R. 2331, 2336; 59 D.L.R. (3d) 333, 343.
70Id.
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words, does the insurer have to prove both these requirements or does it have
to prove only one to defeat the insured's claim for indemnity? Second, what
is the meaning of "potential prejudice which [cannot] be quantified after the
event?" If all the latter statement means is that insurers need only show that
they might have been prejudiced, then this will be a fairly easy hurdle for
them to surmount.
There is a second major problem. There is an important decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada which states that in a failure to co-operate case,
the insurer may refuse to indemnify the insured, even though the insurer
cannot show prejudice and even though it (the insurer) cannot show that the
insured acted in bad faith. In Marcoux v. Halifax Insurance,71 the insured's
truck overturned and struck a pedestrian walking on the sidewalk in Montreal.
The pedestrian stated he was not injured and refused to be taken to a doctor
or hospital. The insured did not notify his insurer, although a clause of his
policy stated that notice was to be given promptly whenever an accident
involving bodily injury happened. Two months later, the pedestrian claimed
damages for injuries to the extent of $2,204.50. The insured notified his insurer who eventually refused to indemnify the insured. The Supreme Court
of Canada held that the insured was not entitled to an indemnity. Not only did
the court fail to find any prejudice to the insurer, but it also failed to find
that the insured had acted in bad faith. The only comment on the insured's
behaviour was made by Mr. Justice Rand who held that the insured had acted
negligently. His Lordship stated: "On the facts, then, as they have been
presented, I feel bound to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to indicate
to a reasonable
and prudent person that bodily injury had most probably been
72
suffered."
It might be argued that Marcoux is distinguishable since it was an appeal
from Quebec which does not have a section in the Civil Code providing for
relief against forfeiture similar to section 103 of the Ontario Insurance Act.
It is submitted that this argument is not very convincing since Quebec does
have an analogue to section 103 of the Ontario Act. Article 2478 of the
Quebec Civil Cole provides, in part, that "[fif it be impossible for the insured
to give notice or make the preliminary proof within the delay specified in the
policy, he is entitled to a reasonable extension of time."
To complicate matters further, Marcoux has been followed by the Court
of Appeal of one common law province which has a provision in its Insurance
Act providing for relief against forfeiture on the same basis as Section 103
of the Ontario Insurance Act. Thus, a majority of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal followed the Marcoux decision in Glenburn Dairy v. Canadian
General Insurance.73 In that case, notice of a claim was given to insurers ten
months after the occurrence of an accident. The majority of the court of
Appeal held that notice had not been given "as soon as practicable" as required by the insurance policy. The court held, following Marcoux, that this
71

[1948] S.C.R. 278; [1948] 4 D.L.R. 143.

72

[1948] S.C.R. 278, 286; [1948] 4 D.L.R. 143, 150.

73

(1953), 9 W.W.R. 501.
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fact defeated the insured's claim to an indemnity. There was no evidence
either that the insurer had been prejudiced by the giving of late notice or that
the insured acted in bad faith. The Court of Appeal did not find it necessary
to discuss the relief from forfeiture provision in the British Columbia Insurance Act.
With the law in this state of confusion, it was incumbent on the court
to shed some light on a very murky and important area of the law. At least,
the court should have clarified the status of the Marcoux decision.
It is suggested that a rule which does justice to the interests of the
insurer, the insured and the accident victim, is one that requires the insurer
to plead and prove that the insured's failure to co-operate has caused the
insurer real prejudice - that is, the insurer must prove that the outcome of
the case would probably have been different if the insured had co-operated
with the insurer.?4 This rule has been criticised on the ground that it has
forced the insurer, in effect, to relitigate the original trial and establish that
the result would have been different if the insurer had had prompt notice. 75
It is difficult to accept this criticism since the proposed rule only requires the
insurer to prove that it did suffer loss.
CONCLUSION
The common thread of the cases analysed is the failure of the court
to state principles of some generality for the guidance of lower courts and
practitioners. It is true, as Holmes said, that general principles do not decide
concrete cases, but our starting point must always be a general principle.
Sometimes a general principle will have to give way to another general principle. When this happens, the court is under an obligation to state why it has
preferred one principle to another.
The Supreme Court seems to be deciding each case on its facts, without
disclosing what facts it regards as crucial and why. 76 The temptation to decide
each case on its merits is great but it must be resisted. Very serious harm is
done to the key value of predictability. If the highest court in the land is
prepared to decide each case on the basis of undisclosed "equities," then
lower courts will also be forced to play the game of "catch as catch can."
Once this happens, the whole process of litigation runs the risk of being turned
into an immoral and expensive farce.
74 This is the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Billington v.
InterinsuranceExchange (1969), 71 Cal. (2d) 728; 456 P. (2d) 982.
75
Bolton, Notice and Related Cooperation Provisions of Insurance: A Compendium
of CaliforniaLegal Principles (1973), Insurance Counsel Journal 39.
7
OMy colleague, Profesor Taman, has noted, in another area of the court's work,
the predisposition on the part of the court "to circumvent difficult issues of principle
by recourse to some sense of the equity of the individual case"; see, his article, The
Adversary Process on Trial: Full Answer and Defence and The Right to Counsel (1975),
13 O.H.L.J. 251, 277.

